Do Mandatory U.S. State Renewable Portfolio Standards Increase Electricity Prices? by Wang, Hongbo
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Do Mandatory U.S. State Renewable
Portfolio Standards Increase Electricity
Prices?
Hongbo Wang
8. October 2014
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/59165/
MPRA Paper No. 59165, posted 8. October 2014 23:33 UTC
  
 
 
Do Mandatory U.S. State Renewable Portfolio Standards  
Increase Electricity Prices? 
 
 
Hongbo Wang                    
PhD Candidate 
Department of Economics and Legal Studies 
Business Building 
Oklahoma State University  
Stillwater, OK 74075 
Phone: (405)744-8667 
hongbo.wang@okstate.edu 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) are U.S. state mandates that utilities produce some of their 
electricity using renewable energy sources in an effort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 
While advocates highlight the potential long-term benefits of RPS, critics argue that RPS will 
increase electricity prices due to the higher costs of renewable energy generation. However, to 
date, there are no published empirical studies of the effect of RPS on electricity prices. Using 
state-level panel data from 1990 to 2011 and the difference-in-differences (DID) method, I find 
that implementation increases electricity prices when the RPS policy first becomes binding.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, global climate change and concerns over scarcity of conventional energy 
resources increased interest in renewable energy sources. In the United States, states have 
enacted a variety of policy instruments to promote the use of renewable energy. One of the most 
common state-level policies is known as Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS). The goals of a 
RPS policy are reducing emissions of air pollution and greenhouse gases and generating more 
stable energy prices in the long-run. A majority of states have enacted RPS with more states 
likely to in the future because of the recent proposal by the Obama Administration to reduce state 
carbon emissions by 30 percent (Metheny, 2014). According to the Database of State Incentive 
for Renewables and Efficiency (DSIRE),1 as of November 2012, 29 states and the District of 
Columbia have adopted mandatory RPS, while 8 states have adopted voluntary renewable 
portfolio goals. Moreover, the states adopting RPS policies all set up a schedule of intermediate 
goals for the utilities to make sure they meet the final RPS mandates by the required year.2  
Renewable portfolio standards require electricity retailers to provide a minimum 
percentage or quantity of their electricity supplies from renewable resources, such as wind, solar, 
biomass and geothermal. A number of studies have found RPS policies to increase the amount of 
renewable energy generation in a state (Langniss and Wiser, 2003; Carley, 2009; Shrimali and 
Kniefel, 2011). While advocates highlight these long-term benefits of RPS, critics contend that 
RPS, at least in the short-run, increase retail electricity prices because of the required extra 
investments or costs to using renewable energy (Lesser, 2013). Rising electricity prices would 
adversely affect the state economy through increasing household cost of living and business 
production costs. 
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 Database of State Incentive for Renewables and Efficiency (www.dsireusa.org). 
2
 All these final RPS mandates will occur after 2011. 
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To be sure, Ohio governor, John Kasich signed a bill into law, which would freeze Ohio’s 
renewable energy efficiency standards for two years, citing concerns that the standards would 
adversely affect the Ohio economy. Ohio became the first state in the U.S to renege on its 
renewable standards (Knox, 2014). Other states, including Kansas, Minnesota, North Carolina, 
Texas, Virginia, West Virginia, likewise have considered or are considering repealing RPS or 
weakening targets (Gallucci, 2013). Despite the concerns that RPS increases the retail price of 
the electricity, to date, there is little published research that provides empirical evidence for the 
argument, especially at the state level. The existing research primarily uses numerical 
simulations to evaluate the role of a hypothetical national RPS such as Palmer and Burtraw 
(2005) and Kydes (2007).  
This paper uses a state-year difference-in-differences (DID) analysis over the period 1990 
to 2011 across 47 states, excluding Iowa, Hawaii and Alaska to examine the impact of state RPS 
on state electricity prices.3 To address the special features that RPS vary in different timing and 
magnitude of intermediate mandates and final mandates, this paper employs multiple measures 
of RPS, including the first year of RPS mandate enactment, the first year of RPS implementation 
and the year that the first intermediate RPS goal becomes binding, instead of assuming only one 
binary RPS variable across states.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents background 
information on electricity generation and renewable energy sources, while section 3 discusses the 
existing literature on Renewable Portfolio Standards. Section 4 describes the empirical 
methodology and data used in the analysis. Section 5 presents and discusses the main findings.  
The primary findings are that RPS increase electricity prices when the mandates become binding. 
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 Iowa was excluded from the sample was because it first adopted RPS in 1983. Hawaii and Alaska were excluded from sample 
due to their special locations. 
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Section 6 summarizes and concludes the paper. The overall recommendation is that policy 
makers need to consider the electricity price increases in deciding whether to enact RPS because 
of their potential economic impacts. 
2. BACKGROUND  
2.1 Background of the Electricity Market 
Most electricity in the United States is generated by three fuels: coal, natural gas and 
nuclear power. Renewable energy, including hydroelectric power, is still a small percentage of 
all power generated. According to the US Energy Information Administration (EIA),4 renewable 
energy sources only made up 13% of total electricity generation in the United States as of 2011. 
Maine had non-hydroelectric renewable electricity generation at 27% of total in-state generation. 
South Dakota and Iowa had 21% and 17% of electricity generation from renewable energy 
sources. When a state implements RPS, it induces shifts from electricity generation using 
traditional resources to renewable resources. Because of potential effects on utility cost 
structures from the shifts, RPS may affect electricity prices as regulatory commissions allow 
utilities to set prices to recoup the costs (Lazar, 2011). 
Customers in the electricity market can be classified into four groups: residential, 
commercial, industrial and transportation. According to EIA, there were 3,726 billion kWh of 
electricity sold to customers in 2011. The residential customers group purchased 38% of the 
electricity that was generated. The commercial group purchased approximately 35%, while 
around 26% was purchased by industrial customers. The electricity prices vary by each customer 
group (Figure 1). Thus, it is necessary to test the impact of electricity prices in each group 
separately. The residential group is the primary focus in this paper. 
2.2 Background of Renewable Portfolio Standards 
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 The US Energy Information Administration (http://www.eia.gov/). 
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Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) according to EIA (2014 a), require or encourage 
electricity producers to supply a certain minimum share of their electricity from designated 
renewable resources within a given jurisdiction. RPS are enacted at the state level in the United 
States. After Iowa adopted the first RPS in 1983, the majority of states passed or strengthened 
their standards after 2000. Altogether, 29 states and the District of Columbia had enacted RPS or 
other mandated renewable capacity policies by 2011. In addition, eight states have voluntary 
goals for renewable generation. Figure 2 shows the locations of mandatary renewable capacity 
policies.  
Often, the selected eligible resources are tailored to best fit the state’s particular resource 
base or local preferences. Some states also set targets for specific types of renewable energy 
sources or technologies to encourage their development and use. As mentioned by Yin and 
Power (2010), there are three ways for a utility to meet the requirement from the state mandate: 
produce electricity from renewable energy sources through its own facility; purchase electricity 
from other renewable energy facilities; and purchase renewable energy certificates (RECs). In 
general, the utilities are allowed to recover the costs combined with the standards in the form of 
electricity rates.  
Even though the RPS law may provide compliance cost caps and provisions for delaying 
compliance, many state RPS programs have “escape clauses” if the extra cost of renewable 
generation exceeds a specific threshold. For example, in Maryland, it has been stated that “if the 
actual or projected dollar cost for purchasing solar RECs in any one year is greater than or equal 
to 1% of the electric supplier’s total annual electricity sales revenues in Maryland, the electricity 
supplier may request that the PSC delay by 1 year each of the scheduled percentages for solar 
and allow the solar percentage required for that year to continue to apply to the electricity 
supplier for the following year. The delay will continue each year until the actual or anticipated 
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cost is less than 1% of the supplier’s annual sales revenue in Maryland, at which time the 
supplier will be subject to the next scheduled percentage increase” (see www.dsireusa.org). 
Based on the above information, imposing state-level RPS would influence utilities’ cost 
structures due to the incremental investments and costs in providing obligated renewable 
electricity proportion. And, allowing utilities to recover the cost may cause electricity prices to 
rise.  
3. PREVIOUS RPS STUDIES  
Previous studies of RPS policy effects on electricity prices have ranged from using 
numerical simulation models of national electricity generation to empirical estimation using 
state-level data. There is a near absence of studies on RPS at the regional level. The variation 
across states in enacting RPS policies, and timing of policy enactment and implementation, can 
be used to assess whether the policies increase electricity costs.   
Palmer and Burtraw (2005) in their discussion paper used the Haiku electricity market 
model and performed numerical simulations to predict the effects of the two leading government 
policies, RPS and Renewable Energy Production Credit (REPC), in increasing the amount of 
renewable energies of the United States electricity supply. The simulation results of four national 
RPS of 5%, 10%, 15% and 20% indicated that the cost of the RPS in terms of changes in 
electricity price or social cost were relatively low at levels up to 15%; the price effects rose 
dramatically for targets of 20%.  
 Kydes (2007) analyzed the impacts of imposing a 20% federal RPS in energy markets of 
the US, excluding non-hydropower by 2020. He conducted this empirical study using the 
December 2001 version of the National Energy Modeling System (NEMS) of EIA and the 
assumption and results of the Annual Energy Outlook 2002 reference case. The study showed 
that electricity costs increased about 3% with a 20% RPS. Even though, on the national level, the 
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results did not appear to be significant, the regional distributional price effects were quite 
significant. The RPS was predicted to increase the costs from 35 to 60 billion dollars for the 
power generation industry by the end of 2020. Although this research focused on the impact of 
federal-level RPS, it provided the reference of the fundamental hypothesis of this study that 
imposing an RPS would change utilities’ cost structures. 
 Bowen et al. (2013) examined whether RPS increased the number of green businesses 
and jobs at the state level. They report little evidence of such an effect. Instead, they suggest that 
green jobs are created by the factors that affect overall job creation; e.g., investments in 
education and infrastructure. 
 In an unpublished paper, Tra (2009) evaluated the effect of RPS policies on retail 
residential electricity rates using utility-level panel data from 1990 to 2006. This study provided 
one of the first empirical investigations of the economic effect of RPS mandates on retail rates. 
After taking the restructuring of the electricity market into consideration, the author used a fixed 
effects model to address the time-invariant unobserved differences among utilities and year 
specific effects while controlling for state population, population density, and the average price 
of coal and natural gas delivered to electric utilities. Tra found that, on average, a state RPS had 
a positive effect on the average nominal residential electricity rates and higher RPS requirements 
had larger magnitude effect on the rates.  
4. EMPIRICAL IMPLEMENTATION 
4.1 Empirical Model 
 Currently, there is no national RPS policy and not all states have adopted RPS policies. 
So, it is possible to construct a treatment group and a control group by using the states that have 
RPS and states that do not have RPS. Also, it is possible to compare the RPS impacts by 
comparing the electricity prices before and after the states adopted mandatory RPS. Therefore, 
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the difference-in-differences (DID) method is employed to examine the state mandatory RPS 
impacts on electricity prices.  
One of the potential problems with using the states without RPS as a control group is that 
electricity prices might systematically vary across states because of other influences than policy 
changes. States with significant renewable resources, such as wind, may be more willing and 
able to adopt RPS, with potentially different price effects. Thus, state fixed effects are included 
to control for time invariant variables.  
Other factors such as temperature in each state also may have impacts on electricity 
prices. Temperatures influence peak load demand, influencing costs of generating electricity 
(U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2014 b). So, January and July temperatures of each 
state are incorporated into the model. With state fixed effects included, however, the temperature 
variables only reflect within-state variation across time.  
Moreover, national level economic shocks might influence electricity prices. Because the 
time span of the data is from 1990 to 2011, three recessions during the period, July 1990 to 
March 1991, March 2001 to November 2001, and December 2007 to June 2009, may have 
impacts on the electricity prices. Although I use the real price of electricity, there still might be 
shocks related to a specific year, such as changes in national taxes, subsidies, and the political 
environment. If the omitted characteristics correlate with electricity prices and RPS, biased and 
inconsistent estimates of the impacts of the RPS on the electricity prices result. Hence, to capture 
national shocks, year fixed effects are included. In addition, electricity market deregulation 
might have impacts on the price setting of different states and producers.5 A deregulation 
indicator variable is included then to control for the impact of electricity market restructuring. 
                                                           
5
 Taber et al., (2006) did not find that deregulation leads to lower electricity rates. However, Fabrizon et al (2007) estimated that 
electricity deregulation had resulted in reduced generation costs for investor-owned power plants. 
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Finally, it is possible that there may be long-term trends in electricity prices not related to RPS. 
Consequently, linear and quadratic time trend dummies are added into the model. Considering 
that time trends may vary across geographic areas, I interact the time trend variables with Census 
division dummy variables.  
The basic regression equation is as follows: 
log  = 	
 +  +  + 
 +  ∗  !
+ "
 ∗  ! + #$	& + #$	&
+ '( + )
 + * 
where log  is the natural log of the average residential real price of electricity for state s during 
year t. For each state s, 	
 is an indicator variable that equals 1 if RPS is implemented in year 
t and 0 otherwise.  is the electricity market restructuring indicator and equals 1 
if electricity restructuring is active in state s during year t and 0 otherwise.6  is the time 
trend dummy indicator for year t.  ! represents a vector of indicator variables for the 
Census divisions (from 1 to 9) that state s belongs in, where the first division, the New England 
division, is omitted to avoid perfect collinearity. $	& is the average July 
temperature for the state s during year t whereas $	& represents the average 
January temperature. ( is the year fixed effect in year t. 
 is the state fixed effect for 
the state s. * is the error term, which is clustered by state across time to correct the standard 
errors for serial correlation. A check for potential endogeneity of RPS policies follows in Section 
5.2. 
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 According to EIA, some states had restructuring activities or allowed utilities to recover transition costs that were incurred 
during the restructuring process after electricity market restructuring was suspended, such as CA, AZ, VA, MT and NM. 
Considering these activities would have impacts on electricity prices and related to the electricity market restructuring behavior, I 
include them into the deregulation indicators. For the sensitivity analysis, firstly, I use a separate indicator to indicate these 
market behaviors. In the results not shown, the coefficient of the separate indicator is negative and significant. Secondly, I use 
only the active electricity restructuring year to identify the deregulation indicator. In the results not shown, the coefficients of 
deregulation indicators are all negative and significant; the impacts of RPS becoming binding on the electricity prices are all 
positive and significant. 
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 Using a single binary variable for 	
 as an indicator of an RPS mandate implicitly 
assumes that RPS policies are equivalent across states. In reality, however, the policies are 
disparate in the sectors which are required to meet the RPS mandates. By 2020, for example, 
Colorado requires RPS with 30% for investor-owned utilities, 10% for electric cooperatives 
serving fewer than 100,000 meters, 20% for electric cooperative serving 100,000 or more meters 
and 10% for municipal utilities serving more than 4,000 customers. Also, the RPS may vary on 
magnitude and timing of the final and intermediate mandates. Therefore, each RPS policy has a 
date of when it was enacted, became effective and became binding. For instance, the first RPS 
authority of Massachusetts is documented in section 11F from chapter 25 A of General Law 
(M.G.L. ch. 25A, § 11F). The date of enacted is Nov. 25, 1997 and the date of effective is April, 
2002, while the first compliance year of the RPS is 2003. Colorado, as another example, shows 
that the enacted year and effective year are both 2004, while the first binding date is 2007. Other 
aspects of state RPS policies are examined in sensitivity analysis. 
 Table 1 summarizes the enactment, effective, and binding year for the first RPS in each 
state.7 The timing difference might result in different schedules of utilities in shifting to the use 
of renewable resources. As a consequence, a model employing only a single binary variable 
identified by using the effective date could not reflect the special features of the RPS programs. 
Although electricity producers can be forward looking, they might not immediately take any 
action to meet the RPS requirements when the policies are just enacted. Some states set 
intermediate binding mandates schedule that must be met before implementation of the final 
goals of state’ RPS; if not met, states will impose financial penalties on the utilities. I expect that 
                                                           
7
 The first RPS binding year of Connecticut is defined as 2001 which is different to the initial compliance year, 2004, of Bowen 
et al. (2013). The identification follows Public Act No. 98-28 ( http://www.cga.ct.gov/ps98/Act/pa/1998PA-00028-R00HB-
05005-PA.htm). In results not shown, while using year 2004 as the RPS first binding year of Connecticut, the positive impact of 
the first RPS binding mandate on electricity prices is statistically significant. 
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the timing difference between RPS implementation and the first binding renewable requirements 
may influence the schedule with which utilities implement renewable generation. Consequently, 
this study uses multiple measures of RPS, both implementation and the year that the first 
intermediate RPS became binding. Meanwhile, in order to avoid neglecting that forward looking 
utilities reacted quickly after RPS policies enacted, I also use the first enactment year of RPS 
policies. 
4.2 Data 
 This study uses publicly available data from various sources. Table 2 summarizes the 
sources of the main variables. The EIA website provides state-level aggregated electricity prices 
from 1990 to 2011. Altogether, 47 states are included in the sample. Hawaii and Alaska are 
excluded from the dataset because of their location. Iowa is excluded because its RPS policy was 
implemented prior to the sample period. The real electricity price is obtained using the U.S. GDP 
deflator with 2005 as the base year. RPS information was collected from the November, 2012 
DSIRE database.8 The state average temperature can be obtained from the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA, 2014) of the National Climatic Data Center (NCDC). The 
status of electricity regulation can be found on the EIA (2014c).  
5. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
5.1 Main Findings 
Tables 3 and 4 show the regression results for alternative model specifications using 
state-level panel data from 1990 to 2011. Table 3 shows the results using alternative single 
indicators of RPS policies. Table 4 shows the corresponding results using multiple RPS 
indicators in each regression. 
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 The link of the Energy Division website for each state can be found on the DSIRE website.  
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Column (1) of each table shows the impact of RPS policies on the natural logarithm of 
real residential electricity prices controlling only for state fixed effects; whereas, column (2) adds 
linear and quadratic time trends and linear and quadratic time trends that interact with Census 
division indicator variables. Columns (3) and (4) add average July temperature and January 
temperature of each state and electricity market restructuring, respectively. Column (5) shows 
the results when controlling for all the right-hand-side variables included in the column (1) to (4) 
models: state fixed effects, time trend, January and July temperatures and the deregulation of the 
electricity market. Column (6), the full model, shows the results from adding year fixed effects to 
the column (5) model. 
The empirical results shown in Table 3 reveal that RPS policies had positive impacts on 
residential electricity prices. All three single indicator RPS variables were significant in the full 
model regressions. The first binding year was significant across half of the model specifications 
(Columns (4) to (6)), in which the price of electricity increased by nearly seven percent in the 
full model. The electricity price increased over five percent based on the effective year of the 
RPS policy. Even the first year of policy enactment was significant with about a nearly five 
percent effect. Extreme temperatures appeared to increase electricity prices, while moving to a 
deregulated market lowered the prices. 
It might be expected that electric utilities would not immediately shift current or 
traditional resources to renewable electricity generators or purchase REC to meet the RPS 
mandate after enactment because initially violation of RPS is not costly. Yet, if utilities are 
forward looking they may begin compliance immediately prior to the required date of 
implementation, as suggested by the significant variable for policy enactment. The larger value 
for the date of the policy becoming binding in Panel A of Table 3, however, suggests that some 
utilities wait on implementation until they are required to meet the RPS standards. 
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To further investigate the importance of date of enactment versus effective and binding 
dates of the policies, it is necessary to take a look at the results while using multiple RPS 
measurements in the regressions. Thus, Table 4 examines the inclusion of each policy variable in 
combination with the other policy variables, including a model with all three policy variables 
added concurrently. 
I find that the impact of enactment year was not statistically significant when the other 
measures of RPS policies were included. Moreover, it was collinear with the first effective year 
of RPS policies, which was consistent with the RPS identification in Table 1 that most of the 
RPS enactment years were the same as the effective year, the exceptions being AZ, CA, DE, 
MA, NC, and PA. The collinearity explains why the first enactment year was significant when 
using single RPS policy variables in the regressions.  
The binding date of RPS policies was significant across all model regressions in Table 4, 
regardless of which other policy variable was included. When all three variables were included 
(Panel D), policy enactment of the RPS policy and effectiveness of the RPS policy did not affect 
electricity prices, whereas, the date the policy first becomes binding increases electricity prices 
by over five percent in the full model regression.9 Therefore, any response by utilities to RPS 
policies did not show up in electricity prices until the date the RPS policies became binding. 
From Panel D of Table 4, electricity market deregulation reduced prices by 
approximately nine percent.10 While some studies showed that imperfect competition due to 
market power or limited transmission capacity could result in higher electricity rate if these 
conditions gave electric utilities the incentive to restrict output (Green and Newbery, 1992 and 
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 In results not shown, the variable obtained from interacting the RPS first binding year variable with the RPS percentage 
requirement of the first binding goal was statistically insignificant when added to the full model in Panel D. 
10
 In results not shown, when the electricity market restructuring indicator is defined by the starting year of the restructuring 
rather than the completed year, the coefficient of market deregulation indicator was negative and statistically significant. The 
positive impact of the first RPS binding mandate on electricity prices was still statistically significant.  
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Borestein et al., 2000), a prevailing perspective about electricity market restructuring was that 
deregulation would induce more efficient operation. Fabrizon et al (2007) estimated that 
electricity deregulation had resulted in reduced generation costs for investor-owned power 
plants. My finding is consistent with this viewpoint.11 
July temperature had about a 0.4% impact on the change of real residential electricity 
prices per degree, while the January temperature’s impact was less than 0.1% per degree and 
insignificant. Recall that these were within-state changes in temperatures over time; across state 
differences were captured by the fixed effects. These results were consistent with the hypothesis 
that summer or winter temperatures would affect peak time usage of electricity, which affects 
utilities’ cost structures and electricity prices. 
5.2 Endogeneity Check 
 Despite the number of control variables, including state and time fixed effects, I cannot 
rule out the potential of reverse causality between state-level electricity prices and RPS adoption.  
To address this issue, I compare whether enactment of RPS policies had differential changes in 
electricity prices than other states prior to the time of RPS enactment. Firstly, I calculate the 5-
year change in electricity prices prior to the first enactment year of the states that have RPS. 
Secondly, I calculate the mean of the price change in the states that have no RPS in the same 
time period. I use the price change difference between these two groups to address whether 
endogeneity potentially existed. Figure 3 demonstrates that the price change differences between 
states with RPS and states without RPS were scattered along 0, indicating a lack of clear pattern 
of price changes prior to the RPS enactment. Therefore, I conclude that there was no reverse 
causality between state-level electricity prices and RPS adoption. 
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 In results not shown, variables obtained from interacting the RPS policy variables with the deregulation variable were all 
statistically insignificant when added to the full model.  
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6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION  
Using state-level panel data from 1990 to 2011 and a difference-in-differences approach, 
I examined whether adoption of Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) by U.S. states caused 
electricity prices to increase. A notable contribution of the study is the use of multiple policy 
measures of RPS policies to distinguish between whether policies have their effects at time of 
enactment, time of effectiveness or when the policies become binding. In addition, the empirical 
approach accounted for state and time fixed effects, differential time trends, while also 
controlling for changes in temperature and regulation of the electricity markets. 
The study found that state adoption of RPS increased electricity prices. Electricity prices 
increased for those states that have implemented binding targets during the sample period. The 
first RPS binding mandate increased prices by over 5 percent. Thus, this study found that RPS 
increased the residential electricity prices in the short run and this variation was captured by the 
first intermediate binding mandate of the policy. The findings suggest that policy makers should 
consider the increase in electricity prices when deciding whether to adopt RPS. For example, the 
economic development benefits of constructing and putting in place wind turbines may be offset 
by the reduction in state economic competitiveness from increased electricity prices. Yet, the 
recently announced plan by the Obama administration to cut carbon emissions from U.S. power 
plants by 30 percent may reduce cost-competitiveness pressures as all states face the possibility 
of more costly power generation. For example, the emissions reductions are based on 2005 
levels, which means that state RPS policies enacted since then will be credited towards the 30 
percent (Metheny, 2014). Ultimately, however, the decision regarding whether to enact RPS and 
how to design them may be based on whether state residents wish to pay for improved air quality 
and reduced impact on global emissions of greenhouse gases. 
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Figure 1: Average Real Electricity Prices of the US 
 
 
Source: Database of State Incentive for Renewables and Efficiency (www.dsireusa.org) 
Figure 2:  States with RPS  
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Figure 3:  Price Change Differences between States with RPS and States without RPS 
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Table 1:  RPS’ 1st binding year, 1st enact year and 1st effective year 
State  1st Binding Year 
1st Enactment 
Year 
1st Effective 
Year 
Arizona 2001 1998 1999 
California 2004 2002 2003 
Colorado 2007 2004 2004 
Connecticut 2001 1998 1998 
Delaware 2007 2005 2006 
Illinois 2008 2007 2007 
Kansas 2011 2009 2009 
Maine 2000 1999 1999 
Maryland 2006 2004 2004 
Massachusetts 2003 1997 2002 
Michigan 2012 2008 2008 
Minnesota 2005 2000 2000 
Missouri 2011 2008 2008 
Montana 2008 2005 2005 
Nevada 2003 1997 1997 
New Hampshire 2008 2007 2007 
New Jersey 2001 1999 1999 
New Mexico 2006 2004 2004 
New York 2006 2004 2004 
North Carolina 2010 2007 2008 
Ohio 2009 2008 2008 
Oregon 2011 2007 2007 
Pennsylvania 2007 2004 2005 
Rhode Island 2007 2004 2004 
Texas 2002 1999 1999 
Washington 2012 2006 2006 
Wisconsin 2000 1998 1998 
Source: Database of State Incentive for Renewables and Efficiency (www.dsireusa.org) and states websites. 
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Table 2: Main Variables and Data Sources 
Main Variables Mean Std. Dev. Source 
Residential Price (Cents per kwh) 
       
8.98         2.65  EIA website  
http://www.eia.gov/ 
Deregulation Indicator 
       
0.20         0.40  
July Temperature 
     
74.27         5.53  NOAA website 
http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/ 
Jan Temperature 
     
31.30       11.56  
GDP Deflator     92.42       12.46 BEA website 
http://www.bea.gov/ 
Binding Indicator 
       
0.15         0.36  
DSIRE and each state website 
http://www.dsireusa.org/ Enact Indicator 
       
0.23         0.42  
Effective Indicator 
       
0.22         0.41  
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Table 3: RPS Impacts on Residential Electricity Prices using Single RPS Indicators       
Pane A: Using first binding year as RPS indicator 
 
Ln Real Residential Electricity Price 
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
RPS_Binding year 
0.0337 0.0461 0.0461 0.0756** 0.0755** 0.0679** 
(1.409) (1.552) (1.547) (2.683) (2.678) (2.399) 
July Temperature   
0.00209** 
 
0.00144 0.00375*** 
  
(2.558) 
 
(1.592) (2.989) 
Jan Temperature   
-0.000486 
 
-9.62e-05 0.000694 
  
(-1.148) 
 
(-0.237) (1.465) 
Deregulation Indicator    
-0.102*** -0.102*** -0.0859*** 
   
(-3.853) (-3.833) (-3.009) 
Constant 
2.238*** 2.380*** 2.242*** 2.368*** 2.265*** 2.033*** 
(612.7) (160.8) (39.60) (176.7) (36.38) (21.95) 
Time trend N Y Y Y Y Y 
Time trend^2 N Y Y Y Y Y 
Time *Division N Y Y Y Y Y 
Time^2 *Division N Y Y Y Y Y 
State FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE N N N N N Y 
Serial correlation adjusted Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 1,034 1,034 1,034 1,034 1,034 1,034 
R2 0.014 0.396 0.398 0.463 0.464 0.513 
No. of State id 47 47 47 47 47 47 
Panel B: Using first enact year as RPS indicator 
 
Ln Real Residential Electricity Price 
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
RPS_Enact year 
0.00687 0.0188 0.0193 0.0495** 0.0496** 0.0465** 
(0.363) (0.894) (0.919) (2.436) (2.448) (2.239) 
July Temperature   
0.00213** 
 
0.00159* 0.00387*** 
  
(2.510) 
 
(1.749) (3.038) 
Jan Temperature   
-0.000561 
 
-0.000256 0.000675 
  
(-1.295) 
 
(-0.654) (1.386) 
Deregulation Indicator    
-0.0983*** -0.0975*** -0.0826** 
   
(-3.391) (-3.372) (-2.650) 
Constant 
2.242*** 2.382*** 2.243*** 2.372*** 2.264*** 2.027*** 
(519.0) (168.2) (38.60) (186.4) (36.43) (21.69) 
Time trend N Y Y Y Y Y 
Time trend^2 N Y Y Y Y Y 
Time *Division N Y Y Y Y Y 
Time^2 *Division N Y Y Y Y Y 
State FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE N N N N N Y 
Serial correlation adjusted Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 1,034 1,034 1,034 1,034 1,034 1,034 
R2 0.001 0.384 0.386 0.444 0.445 0.499 
No. of State id 47 47 47 47 47 47 
Panel C: Using first effective year as RPS indicator 
 
Ln Real Residential Electricity Price 
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Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
RPS_Effective year 
0.0130 0.0275 0.0280 0.0551** 0.0551*** 0.0507** 
(0.679) (1.293) (1.314) (2.686) (2.691) (2.467) 
July Temperature   
0.00214** 
 
0.00157* 0.00381*** 
  
(2.499) 
 
(1.716) (2.986) 
Jan Temperature   
-0.000577 
 
-0.000274 0.000633 
  
(-1.345) 
 
(-0.695) (1.277) 
Deregulation Indicator    
-0.0981*** -0.0973*** -0.0822*** 
   
(-3.498) (-3.476) (-2.716) 
Constant 
2.240*** 2.382*** 2.243*** 2.372*** 2.265*** 2.033*** 
(530.2) (168.5) (38.51) (187.2) (36.26) (21.71) 
Time trend N Y Y Y Y Y 
Time trend^2 N Y Y Y Y Y 
Time *Division N Y Y Y Y Y 
Time^2 *Division N Y Y Y Y Y 
State FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE N N N N N Y 
Serial correlation adjusted Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 1,034 1,034 1,034 1,034 1,034 1,034 
R2 0.003 0.387 0.389 0.448 0.450 0.502 
No. of State id 47 47 47 47 47 47 
       *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4: RPS Impacts on Residential Electricity Prices using Multiple RPS Indicators       
Panel A: Using first binding year and enact year as RPS indicators to check the joint effect 
  Ln Real Residential Electricity Price 
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
RPS_Binding year 
0.0572** 0.0483* 0.0479* 0.0654** 0.0652** 0.0577** 
(2.265) (1.757) (1.736) (2.495) (2.482) (2.183) 
RPS_Enact year 
-0.0296 -0.00400 -0.00338 0.0213 0.0215 0.0212 
(-1.460) (-0.275) (-0.233) (1.487) (1.502) (1.393) 
July Temperature   
0.00209** 
 
0.00147 0.00371*** 
  
(2.542) 
 
(1.607) (2.925) 
Jan Temperature   
-0.000480 
 
-0.000118 0.000714 
  
(-1.105) 
 
(-0.294) (1.531) 
Deregulation Indicator    
-0.107*** -0.106*** -0.0907*** 
   
(-3.955) (-3.937) (-3.091) 
Constant 
2.241*** 2.380*** 2.242*** 2.368*** 2.264*** 2.036*** 
(483.1) (161.3) (39.58) (180.0) (36.24) (21.85) 
Time trend N Y Y Y Y Y 
Time trend^2 N Y Y Y Y Y 
Time *Division N Y Y Y Y Y 
Time^2 *Division N Y Y Y Y Y 
State FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE N N N N N Y 
Serial correlation adjusted Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 1,034 1,034 1,034 1,034 1,034 1,034 
R2 0.021 0.396 0.398 0.466 0.467 0.515 
No. of State id 47 47 47 47 47 47 
Panel B: Using first binding year and effective year as RPS indicators to check the joint effect 
 
Ln Real Residential Electricity Price 
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
RPS_Binding year 
0.0504* 0.0429 0.0425 0.0618** 0.0616** 0.0548** 
(1.938) (1.556) (1.535) (2.347) (2.334) (2.064) 
RPS_Effective year 
-0.0204 0.00544 0.00603 0.0256* 0.0257* 0.0243 
(-0.984) (0.377) (0.418) (1.764) (1.769) (1.657) 
July Temperature   
0.00211** 
 
0.00147 0.00369*** 
  
(2.554) 
 
(1.600) (2.915) 
Jan Temperature   
-0.000499 
 
-0.000134 0.000692 
  
(-1.164) 
 
(-0.332) (1.455) 
Deregulation Indicator    
-0.107*** -0.106*** -0.0900*** 
   
(-4.017) (-3.997) (-3.132) 
Constant 
2.240*** 2.380*** 2.241*** 2.368*** 2.265*** 2.038*** 
(497.7) (161.6) (39.52) (180.3) (36.26) (21.91) 
Time trend N Y Y Y Y Y 
Time trend^2 N Y Y Y Y Y 
Time *Division N Y Y Y Y Y 
Time^2 *Division N Y Y Y Y Y 
State FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE N N N N N Y 
Serial correlation adjusted Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 1,034 1,034 1,034 1,034 1,034 1,034 
R2 0.017 0.396 0.398 0.467 0.468 0.516 
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No of State id 47 47 47 47 47 47 
Panel C: Using first  enact year and effective year as RPS indicators to check the joint effect 
  Ln Real Residential Electricity Price 
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
RPS_Effective year 
0.0773*** 0.0650** 0.0648** 0.0602** 0.0601** 0.0509** 
(3.021) (2.559) (2.546) (2.536) (2.527) (2.228) 
RPS_Enact year 
-0.0669*** -0.0405** -0.0399** -0.00568 -0.00548 -0.000197 
(-3.917) (-2.352) (-2.324) (-0.318) (-0.311) (-0.00994) 
July Temperature   
0.00211** 
 
0.00157* 0.00381*** 
  
(2.446) 
 
(1.714) (2.985) 
Jan Temperature   
-0.000580 
 
-0.000276 0.000633 
  
(-1.332) 
 
(-0.698) (1.296) 
Deregulation Indicator    
-0.0977*** -0.0969*** -0.0821** 
   
(-3.403) (-3.384) (-2.648) 
Constant 
2.242*** 2.381*** 2.245*** 2.372*** 2.266*** 2.033*** 
(523.3) (168.5) (38.45) (187.0) (36.29) (21.74) 
Time trend N Y Y Y Y Y 
Time trend^2 N Y Y Y Y Y 
Time *Division N Y Y Y Y Y 
Time^2 *Division N Y Y Y Y Y 
State FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE N N N N N Y 
Serial correlation adjusted Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 1,034 1,034 1,034 1,034 1,034 1,034 
R2 0.009 0.389 0.392 0.448 0.450 0.502 
No of State id 47 47 47 47 47 47 
Panel D: Using first binding year, enact year and effective year as RPS indicators to check the joint effect 
  Ln Real Residential Electricity Price 
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
RPS_Binding year 
0.0514* 0.0431 0.0427 0.0618** 0.0616** 0.0548** 
(1.996) (1.572) (1.550) (2.344) (2.331) (2.062) 
RPS_Effective year 
0.0464* 0.0434** 0.0434** 0.0289 0.0288 0.0234 
(1.977) (2.047) (2.026) (1.438) (1.428) (1.263) 
RPS_Enact year 
-0.0701*** -0.0412** -0.0406** -0.00362 -0.00336 0.00100 
(-4.116) (-2.154) (-2.121) (-0.191) (-0.179) (0.0498) 
July Temperature   
0.00207** 
 
0.00147 0.00369*** 
  
(2.498) 
 
(1.601) (2.916) 
Jan Temperature   
-0.000502 
 
-0.000135 0.000693 
  
(-1.150) 
 
(-0.334) (1.481) 
Deregulation Indicator    
-0.106*** -0.106*** -0.0901*** 
   
(-3.908) (-3.891) (-3.051) 
Constant 
2.241*** 2.380*** 2.243*** 2.368*** 2.265*** 2.038*** 
(488.4) (161.7) (39.47) (180.2) (36.34) (21.98) 
Time trend N Y Y Y Y Y 
Time trend^2 N Y Y Y Y Y 
Time *Division N Y Y Y Y Y 
Time^2 *Division N Y Y Y Y Y 
State FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE N N N N N Y 
Serial correlation adjusted Y Y Y Y Y Y 
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N 1,034 1,034 1,034 1,034 1,034 1,034 
R2 0.024 0.398 0.400 0.467 0.468 0.516 
No. of State id 47 47 47 47 47 47 
       *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
